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Corporate Social Responsibility: A Law & 
Economics Perspective 
Jonathan R. Macey* 
INTRODUCTION 
The law and economics of corporate social responsibility are 
simple. Assets are worth more to their owners if they are held 
exclusively by those owners rather than shared. This simple fact 
explains why shareholders prefer to be the exclusive beneficiaries 
of corporate fiduciary duties. If, however, the rules of the game 
were changed and corporations were deemed to have 
responsibilities to society in general, instead of exclusively to 
their shareholders, the shareholders would be harmed because 
the economic value of their shares would decline. Of course, 
shareholders would agree to a change such that corporations 
owed duties to society rather than to the shareholders exclusively 
if they were compensated for this diminution in rights. Thus, if 
non-shareholder constituencies such as local communities, 
workers, suppliers, or customers valued these rights sufficiently, 
they would have them because they would buy them from the 
shareholders. The fact that this does not happen is strong 
evidence that it is efficient to organize corporations such that 
they are run so as to maximize value for shareholders. 
From a law and economics perspective, the corporate social 
responsibility debate is really a debate about how to interpret the 
contracts and understandings that allocate rights and 
responsibilities within corporations and other forms of business 
organizations (hereinafter ―corporations‖), and between 
corporations and those located outside of the corporation, such as 
local communities. The ineluctable reality is that when 
shareholders make investments in a corporation, they do not 
think that they are giving their money away. Rather, they invest 
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the Various Rationales for Making Shareholders the Exclusive Beneficiaries of Corporate 
Fiduciary Duties, 21 STETSON L. REV. 23 (1991). 
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on the premise that they have the right to receive something in 
exchange for their investments. To say that corporations are 
supposed to be managed to maximize shareholder value is simply 
to recognize that part of the reciprocal promise made by the 
corporation in exchange for the investment is an agreement that 
the corporation will be managed for the benefit of the 
shareholders. 
From this very basic perspective comes the insight that the 
fiduciary duties that officers and directors owe to shareholders 
simply reflect a central term of the standard form contract 
created when a corporation issues shares: the corporation is 
promising that the business will be run to maximize returns for 
shareholders. While there is some confusion on this subject, this 
basic contract is entirely mutable in every detail. In other words, 
it is the default rule that is in place unless the corporation, at its 
inception, chooses to make a different set of commitments to 
investors. 
It is not entirely clear that fiduciary duties are particularly 
valuable assets. The fervor of the corporate social responsibility 
debate suggests that having the shareholders‘ right to have the 
corporation managed for their exclusive benefit, as opposed to the 
benefit of all stakeholders, including non-shareholder 
constituencies, must be worth something. Otherwise, it would not 
be worth fighting over. 
The interests of the widely variegated groups of claimants on 
firms‘ assets conflict in numerous ways. By strengthening the 
bargaining position of one group, the law inevitably weakens the 
bargaining position of the other competing groups. 
Building on the axiom that the corporation is a nexus of 
contracts,1 fiduciary duties are simply corporate assets that are 
bargained for and auctioned off among the various groups of 
stakeholders. The bargaining process theoretically could lead to a 
wide variety of outcomes. 
As long as the parties engaged in the bargaining process are 
rational, however, they will agree to stipulate that fiduciary 
duties will be exclusively enjoyed by one constituency, if the 
value of such duties is greater when enjoyed exclusively than 
when shared with other groups. Thus, the allocation of fiduciary 
duties exclusively to one group of claimants does not reflect any 
lack of bargaining power on the part of the groups that do not 
enjoy the privilege of being the beneficiary of such duties. Rather, 
                                                          
 1 See R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386, 393 (1937) (―A firm, 
therefore, consists of the system of relationships which comes into existence when the 
direction of resources is dependent on an entrepreneur.‖). 
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I argue that these other groups benefit by giving up any claims 
they might have on such rights by more than they lose. 
The benefits will vary depending on the nature of the non-
shareholder constituency at issue. They may take the form of 
higher interest rates for bondholders, higher wages or greater job 
security for workers, or higher taxes for local communities. Thus, 
the notion of forbidding companies from offering a standard form 
contract in which shareholders are the exclusive beneficiaries of 
fiduciary duties and requiring firms to allow directors to serve 
broad societal interests will not only make shareholders worse 
off, they make other constituencies worse off as well. 
For over a century, state corporate law doctrine provided 
that the directors of both public and closely held firms owe 
fiduciary duties to shareholders and to shareholders alone. The 
applicable legal norm required directors to manage a corporation 
for the exclusive benefit of its shareholders. Protection for other 
sorts of claimants existed only to the extent provided by contract. 
This principle has been subjected to sustained attack.2 
I argue that fiduciary duties should flow to residual 
claimants and to residual claimants alone. This conclusion stems 
from a contractual analysis, under which residual claimants 
receive the benefits of fiduciary duties, not because other groups 
do not value them, but rather because (1) the aggregate value of 
fiduciary duties to any group within a firm diminishes as those 
rights are shared with other groups; and (2) the shareholders 
value these rights more than any other group. 
Non-shareholder constituencies also value these rights. It 
would be surprising indeed if rights were of value to one group 
but not to another group, just as it would be surprising if the 
rights were of exactly the same value to every group. The very 
nature of the interests and contractual claims of non-shareholder 
constituencies makes it easier for these constituencies to protect 
themselves from post-contractual opportunism by the firm. In 
addition, non-shareholder constituencies already enjoy the 
protection provided by judicial gap-filling and do not need the 
additional gap-filling protections afforded by fiduciary duties. All 
groups ultimately benefit from a legal regime that makes 
shareholders the exclusive beneficiaries of fiduciary duties. 
A valid criticism leveled at other constituency statutes  
is that they require corporate agents to serve so  
                                                          
 2 See, e.g., Comm. on Corporate Laws, Am. Bar Ass‘n, Other Constituencies Statutes: 
Potential for Confusion, 45 BUS. LAW. 2253, 2253 (1990) (criticizing other constituencies 
statutes for carrying the potential to change basic premises of corporate law). 
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many masters—employees, communities, bondholders, 
customers, suppliers—that the costs in terms of confusion and 
misunderstanding on the part of courts and litigants vastly 
outweigh any potential benefits that such statutes might provide. 
But this argument is not dispositive of the debate because it 
ignores the fact that corporations have long been able to issue 
multiple classes of shares with different economic and political 
rights, and corporate management has owed fiduciary duties to 
each of these classes. Thus, it simply cannot be said that 
corporate  
law is incapable of reconciling the claims of a  
variety of competing interests. The argument that other 
constituency statutes will cause confusion also neglects the fact 
that most managers‘ actions are insulated from judicial second-
guessing by the business judgment rule. Accordingly, as a 
practical matter, the rights being taken away from shareholders 
by other constituency statutes were not rights that provided 
much in the way of concrete benefits for shareholders in the first 
place. 
Interestingly, over a significant range of important corporate 
decisions, other constituencies such as fixed claimants or workers 
may actually have the greatest stake in the decisions being 
made. For example, shareholders may well benefit by a corporate 
decision to close a particular plant, but the workers who would 
lose their jobs in that plant closing likely would suffer to a much 
greater extent. 
Similarly, other constituency statutes cannot be condemned 
on the grounds that they upset a system of legal rules that 
present a pre-existing set of clearly defined behavioral guidelines 
for officers and directors. No such set of guidelines exists. 
Rather, the critical problem with other constituency statutes 
is that they fail to recognize that fiduciary duties are owed solely 
to residual claimants because they are the group that faces the 
most severe set of contracting problems with respect to defining 
the nature and extent of the obligations owed to them by officers 
and directors. Fiduciary duties should properly be seen as a 
method of gap-filling in incomplete contracts. And shareholders 
place a far greater value on the protection provided by  
this gap-filling than do the other constituencies of a corporation. 
This observation, of course, raises an obvious follow-up 
question: if gap-filling is a useful device from the shareholders‘ 
perspective, why not from the perspective of these other 
constituencies as well? Here I argue that under modern 
principles of contract law, courts do fill in gaps for these other 
constituencies, but they do so against the background of the pre-
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existing contracts that these groups have with the firm. Thus, 
gap-filling on behalf of such other constituencies as employees 
and bondholders is done in the context of interpreting the 
employment contracts, collective bargaining agreements, bond 
indentures, and covenants that these other groups have with the 
corporation. Necessary gap-filling is achieved in this context. 
The obvious exception to this general rule comes from the 
local communities in which large corporations operate. Unlike 
the rest of the constituencies with which a firm deals, the local 
community has no preexisting agreement with the firm. As such, 
there simply is no gap for a court to fill. However, the local 
community is, or should be, well represented in the political 
process. Any grievance felt by the local community is best 
addressed to local political officials. 
Finally, this paper considers—and rejects—the argument 
that other constituency statutes are worthwhile because they 
prevent inefficient wealth transfers from other constituencies, 
particularly bondholders and employees, to shareholders. The 
question is not whether such wealth transfers are theoretically 
possible, because they clearly are. Rather, the relevant issues are 
(1) whether the dangers associated with such wealth transfers 
can be avoided by contractually negotiated covenants between 
the fixed claimants and the firm; and (2) whether the social costs 
of attempting to mitigate this wealth transfer problem through 
the promulgation of other constituency statutes are greater than 
the social benefits. The answer to both of these questions is yes. 
It seems patently clear that the actual purpose and effect of these 
statutes is to benefit a single non-shareholder constituency, 
namely the top managers of publicly held corporations who want 
still another weapon in their arsenal of anti-takeover protective 
devices. In other words, like many other legislative initiatives, 
other constituency statutes do not benefit the interests or groups 
that they ostensibly are intended to benefit. Rather, such 
statutes benefit a well-organized, highly influential special-
interest group, namely the top managers of large, publicly held 
corporations who wish to terminate the market for corporate 
control. 
I. CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY AND RESIDUAL CLAIMANTS  
Other constituency statutes and other efforts to require 
corporations to shift their focus from shareholders to society are 
inconsistent with the fact that shareholders‘ expectations of 
being the exclusive beneficiaries of fiduciary duties are legitimate 
because this is what they have contracted and paid for. This 
argument derives from the insight of modern financial theory 
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that ―shareholders retain plenary authority to guide the fate of 
the corporate enterprise because . . . they have the greatest stake 
in the outcome of corporate decision-making . . . .‖3 Despite the 
fact that corporations are merely complex webs of contractual 
relations—and despite the fact that shareholders do not ―own‖ 
the modern, publicly held firm in any meaningful sense—the 
ultimate right to guide the firm (or, more precisely, to have it 
guided on their behalf) is retained by the shareholders because 
they are the group that values it most highly.4 
The implication of this analysis for the allocation of fiduciary 
responsibilities within the firm is not entirely clear. To say that 
shareholders place the highest value on the rights protected by 
fiduciary duties is not the same as saying that shareholders are 
the only group that values such rights. Clearly, many 
discretionary decisions within the corporation harm the rights of 
other claimants. For example, in recent years corporations have: 
(1) ―[r]edeem[ed] refunding-protected debt with proceeds of an 
equity offering, while at the same time borrowing for other 
corporate purposes at‖ lower interest rates;5 (2) ―[d]eliberately 
engineer[ed] a technical default in a private debt covenant, in 
order to be ‗forced‘ to retire a high coupon issue that was 
otherwise fully call-protected‖;6 (3) ―[b]orrow[ed] heavily in the 
short-term market, [and] then offer[ed] bondholders a choice 
between amending a covenant limitation on funded debt or 
leaving the issuer severely exposed to interest rate fluctuations 
and burdened with large near-term maturities‖;7 and (4) 
―[l]everag[ed] . . . [their capital structure] to avoid a hostile 
takeover, thereby triggering a decline in the company‘s bond 
rating . . . , notwithstanding the bondholders‘ longstanding  
assumption that the issuer desired to maintain the highest 
possible rating in order to minimize its borrowing costs.‖8 
Thus, the interesting question is not why shareholders 
receive the benefits of fiduciary duties, but why they should be 
the exclusive beneficiaries of fiduciary duties, given that other 
constituencies would benefit if they had the rights created by the 
imposition of such duties. But why would shareholders, as 
residual claimants, place the highest value on fiduciary duties? 
                                                          
 3 Jonathan R. Macey, Externalities, Firm-Specific Capital Investments, and the 
Legal Treatment of Fundamental Corporate Changes, 1989 DUKE L.J. 173, 175 (1989). 
 4 Id. 
 5 Martin S. Fridson, Bondholder Rights: A Survey of Current Issues, EXTRA CREDIT: 
THE JOURNAL OF HIGH YIELD BOND RESEARCH, Jan.–Feb. 1992, at 33. 
 6 Id. 
 7 Id. at 34. 
 8 Id. 
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After all, once we accept the view that the firm is not an entity at 
all but a set of contracts or series of bargains: 
[The organization] . . . decomposes . . . into a group of identifiable 
participants—e.g., investors, managers, creditors, employees and 
suppliers—who negotiate an equilibrium position among themselves. 
An implication of this perspective is to deny that any one class of 
participants (i.e., the shareholders) have a natural right to view 
themselves as owners of the firm. Rather, shareholders are seen not 
as the firm‘s owners, but as suppliers of equity capital; they are the 
‗residual claimants,‘ who bring to the firm their special ability at risk-
bearing, which creditors, managers, and employees tend to lack.9 
Of course, ―[o]nce we view the shareholders as simply the 
residual claimants who have agreed to accept a more 
uncertain . . . return because of their superior risk-bearing 
capacity, it is far from self-evident that they are necessarily 
entitled to control the firm,‖10 that is, to have managers‘ and 
directors‘ fiduciary duties flow exclusively to them. 
The rationale for why shareholders place the highest value 
on such rights is said to be that,  
[u]niquely, the residual claimants . . . are interested in the firm‘s 
overall profitability, whereas creditors and managers [and 
presumably other constituents as well] are essentially fixed claimants 
who wish only to see their claims repaid and who will logically tend to 
resist risky activities. Having less interest in the overall economic 
performance of the firm, creditors can bargain through contract and 
do not need representation on the board to monitor all aspects of the 
firm‘s performance.11 
Thus, fiduciary duties exist because the decisions that face 
officers and directors of corporations are sufficiently complex and 
difficult to predict. It would therefore not be feasible to specify, in 
advance, how such officers and directors should respond to a wide 
range of future contingencies. Fiduciary duties are the 
mechanism invented by the legal system for filling in the 
unspecified terms of shareholders‘ contingent contacts. It has 
been argued that these duties run exclusively to shareholders 
because, as residual claimants, ―[t]he gains and losses from 
abnormally good or bad performance are the lot of the 
shareholders, whose claims stand last in line.‖12 As Easterbrook 
and Fischel have observed: 
                                                          
 9 JESSE H. CHOPER, JOHN C. COFFEE, JR. & C. ROBERT MORRIS, JR., CASES AND 
MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 28 (3d ed. 1989). 
 10 Id. at 29. 
 11 Id. 
 12 Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Voting in Corporate Law, 26 J.L. & 
ECON. 395, 403 (1983), available at http://www.jstor.org/stable/725097. 
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As the residual claimants, the shareholders are the group with the 
appropriate incentives . . . to make discretionary decisions. The firm 
should invest in new products, plants, etc., until the gains and costs 
are identical at the margin. Yet all of the actors, except the 
shareholders, lack the appropriate incentives. Those with fixed claims 
on the income stream may receive only a tiny benefit (in increased 
security) from the undertaking of a new project. The shareholders 
receive most of the marginal gains and incur most of the marginal 
costs. They therefore have the right incentives to exercise discretion 
[or to have it exercised on their behalf].13 
A simple illustration can be used to demonstrate this point. 
Suppose that a firm has two classes of claimants: fixed and 
residual. The firm will owe $1 million to the fixed claimants at 
the end of period one. Suppose further that the firm has to choose 
between two projects: A and B. Both of these projects will require 
the firm to allocate one hundred percent of its resources to that 
project for the relevant period. Project A has a 0.5 chance of 
producing a pay-off with a present value of $1 million, and a 0.5 
chance of producing a pay-off with a present value of $5 million 
at the end of period one. Thus, the expected present value of 
project A is $3 million.14 Project B, on the other hand, has a 
pay-off matrix in which there is a 0.5 chance of a pay-off with a 
present value of $6 million, and a 0.5 chance of a pay-off with a 
present value of $1 million. Thus, while project A has an 
expected value of $3 million, project B has an expected value of 
$3.5 million. 
The shareholders will prefer project B, since they are better 
off by $500,000 if they select that project.15 The fixed claimants, 
by contrast, are indifferent as to whether the firm selects project 
A or project B because under either outcome available under 
either project, the fixed claimants are absolutely certain to obtain 
the $1 million that is owed to them by the firm. Where a firm is 
making a decision like this, the fixed claimants clearly do not 
deserve a role in the decision-making process. The firm, and 
society, are better off if the firm selects project B, because that is 
                                                          
 13 Id. 
 14 (0.5 x $1 million) + (0.5 x $5 million) = $3 million. 
 15 Project A has an expected value to the shareholders of $2 million. If the project 
only makes $1 million, the fixed claimants will get all of the gains from the project, and 
there will be nothing left over for the shareholders. If the project makes $5 million, the 
shareholders will get $4 million, because the first million goes to satisfy the firm‘s 
obligations to the fixed claimants. Thus, project A has an expected value to the 
shareholders of $2 million (0.5 x $4 million = $2 million). Project B has an expected value 
of $2.5 million. As before, if the project only makes $1 million, the shareholders get 
nothing. If the project makes $6 million, the shareholders will get $5 million, because the 
first million will go to the fixed claimants of the firm. Thus, project B has an expected 
value to the shareholders of $2.5 million (0.5 x $5 million = $2.5 million). 
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the one that maximizes the firm‘s and society‘s stock of wealth. 
No purpose is served by giving the firm‘s fixed claimants any 
stake in the decision-making process. The only possible result 
from involving them would be to permit them to threaten to 
obstruct the firm‘s efforts to undertake project B in order to 
extract a side payment of some kind. 
The sort of decision described in the above example lies 
behind the intuition that fiduciary duties should flow exclusively 
to a firm‘s shareholders because they are residual claimants. 
Because the relevant decision in this example, like so many 
decisions made by corporations, is infra-marginal with respect to 
all constituencies other than shareholders, the shareholders 
should be the only party with legal rights in the process leading 
to that decision. And, as Easterbrook and Fischel suggest, the 
shareholders‘ position within the firm is unique because 
shareholders are the only group with a meaningful stake in every 
decision made by a solvent firm.  
But not all decisions made by a firm resemble the decision 
suggested in the above example. Suppose that the decision was 
between project A as described above and a third project, C. 
Project C has a 0.5 chance of producing a pay-off at the end of 
period one with a present value of $500,000, and a 0.5 chance of 
producing a pay-off at the end of period one with a present value 
of $10 million. The shareholders would prefer project C to project 
A (or project B, for that matter). Project C has an expected return 
to shareholders of $4.25 million, which compares favorably with 
project A‘s expected return to shareholders of $2 million, and 
project B‘s expected return to shareholders of $2.5 million. 
However, unlike project A and project B, the firm‘s fixed 
claimants are not indifferent with respect to the decision to select 
project C. Under project C, there is a 0.5 chance that the fixed 
claimants will be paid only half of the full $1 million that is owed 
to them. Indeed, the fixed claimants would be willing to pay for 
the right to block project C. 
It is simply incorrect to say that the shareholders are the 
only group with the correct incentives to decide whether to adopt 
project C or project A or B. Nor is it the case that the society 
benefits by allocating the fiduciary duties within the firm 
exclusively to the shareholders on the grounds that the 
shareholders have the greatest incentives to maximize the value 
of the firm. It is possible to manipulate the numbers in the above 
examples—and the actual projects selected in the real world—to 
transfer wealth from the fixed claimants to the residual 
claimants while reducing rather than increasing the overall 
value of the firm.  
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Imagine, for example, that the firm is selecting between two 
projects: D and E. Project D presents a 0.5 chance of producing 
absolutely nothing, and a 0.5 chance of producing a present value 
pay-off of $1.5 million at the end of period one. Project E presents 
a one hundred percent chance of producing a present value pay-
off at the end of period one of $1 million. Ex ante, the overall 
value of the firm is maximized by selecting project E, since that 
produces a present expected value of $1 million, while project D 
produces a present expected value of only $750,000. The 
shareholders, however, would prefer project D to project E, since 
under project E there is no chance that the shareholders will 
realize any pay-off at all, while under project D there is a 0.5 
chance that the shareholders will realize something (that is, 
$500,000 after repaying the $1 million owed to fixed claimants). 
Thus, if the shareholders are left in complete control, they will 
have incentives ―to adopt various strategies with the effect of 
transferring wealth from bondholders to shareholders, such as 
choosing risky investment projects and withdrawing assets from 
the firm.‖16 This example strongly suggests that some of the 
strategies that shareholders can adopt to transfer wealth from 
the fixed claimants and other constituencies to themselves 
reduce the value of the firm, and overall societal wealth as well. 
The point of this discussion is that simply describing 
shareholders as residual claimants to the cash flow of the modern 
corporation does not fully explain why fiduciary duties flow 
exclusively to shareholders. 
The shareholders‘ status as residual claimants provides a 
persuasive rationale for why their interests should trump with 
respect to a wide range of transactions. However, it is also clearly 
the case that other claimants have a strong interest in having 
their preferences taken into account, at least to some extent, in 
decisions about how to allocate corporate resources, because 
these claimants face the realistic prospect of tangible loss if their 
interests are neglected. Thus, the argument that shareholders, as 
residual claimants, have the greatest incentive to maximize the 
value of the firm, and therefore should be the beneficiaries of the 
legal protection afforded by fiduciary duties, is incomplete. It 
does not explain why the interests of other claimants should not 
be respected, at least as regards those decisions that have the 
potential to affect their interests directly. 
The reason that shareholders should be the exclusive 
beneficiaries of fiduciary duties does not lie in the fact that the 
shareholders are residual claimants, but rather in the fact that 
                                                          
 16 Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 12, at 404. 
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fiduciary duties are not public goods. Because fiduciary duties 
are not public goods, the enjoyment by one group of the rights 
associated with such duties necessarily diminishes other groups‘ 
ability to enjoy those benefits. This is particularly true in the 
case of corporate fiduciary duties where the interests of the 
various stakeholders‘ groups actually conflict. 
It is well understood that a discretionary decision by 
directors that increases the wealth of one stakeholder group often 
will diminish the wealth of another group. For example, just as a 
decision by a corporate board of directors to increase the overall 
riskiness of a firm above the expected level transfers wealth from 
fixed claimants to residual claimants, so too does a decision by 
the board to reduce the riskiness of the firm transfers wealth to 
fixed claimants from residual claimants. But the implication of 
this basic point has been lost on those who have supported 
statutes that expand the rights of non-shareholder constituencies 
to include fiduciary duties. 
Another example illustrates this point. Suppose that there 
are only two groups of stakeholders: bondholders and 
stockholders. The bondholders value the right to be the exclusive 
beneficiaries of fiduciary duties at $50, while the shareholders 
value the right to be the exclusive beneficiaries of fiduciary 
duties at $75. If fiduciary duties are shared by both groups, 
however, the aggregate value of the corporate fiduciary duties 
declines to $40 ($20 for each group). If both groups have equal 
bargaining power and are rational, the parties will agree that the 
shareholders should be the exclusive beneficiaries of the 
directors‘ fiduciary duties. The bondholders would accept some 
amount greater than $20 in exchange for agreeing that the 
shareholders will be the exclusive beneficiaries of the directors‘ 
fiduciary duties. The shareholders would pay some amount less 
than $55 to obtain the right to be the exclusive beneficiaries of 
the directors‘ fiduciary duties. Within this range, both groups 
would be better off than if fiduciary duties were shared with the 
other group. In other words, in this example, as long as the 
shareholders pay the bondholders an amount greater than $20 
but less than $55, both will be better off than if the fiduciary 
duties are shared and no exchange is made. Thus, corporate 
shareholders will pay other corporate constituencies for the right 
to have these duties inure to their sole benefit. 
Suppose, for example, the shareholders place an aggregate 
value of $10 million on the legal protection provided by a 
corporate governance system that allocates fiduciary duties 
exclusively to shareholders, while other constituents place a 
value of $2 million on the protection afforded by such duties. 
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Under these assumptions, both parties will be better off if the 
shareholders are permitted to compensate these other 
constituencies—in the form of higher interest on bonds, higher 
wages to workers and managers, and better prices for suppliers 
and customers—to acquire the right to have fiduciary duties flow 
exclusively to them. 
Thus, all constituencies will be better off by allocating 
fiduciary duties within the firm exclusively to shareholders 
because: (1) fiduciary duties are not a public good; and (2) 
shareholders are the group within the firm that places the 
highest value on such duties. 
II. THE TOO MANY MASTERS ARGUMENT 
Another criticism of embracing corporate social 
responsibility is that, to the extent that doing so effects any 
change in firm behavior or existing law, it complicates corporate 
governance immeasurably. Specifically, embracing corporate 
social responsibility requires directors to attempt the impossible: 
pleasing a multitude of masters with competing and conflicting 
interests. As the Committee on Corporate Laws of the American 
Bar Association‘s Section on Business Law has argued in its 
position paper on other constituency statutes: 
  The confusion of directors in trying to comply with such statutes, 
if interpreted to require directors to balance the interests of various 
constituencies without according primacy to shareholder interests, 
would be profoundly troubling. Even under existing law, particularly 
where directors must act quickly, it is often difficult for directors 
acting in good faith to divine what is in the best interests of 
shareholders and the corporation. If directors are required to consider 
other interests as well, the decision-making process will become a 
balancing act or search for compromise. When directors must not only 
decide what their duty of loyalty mandates, but also to whom their 
duty of loyalty runs (and in what proportions), poorer decisions can be 
expected.17 
On one view, the ―too many masters‖ argument is that other 
constituency statutes make life more difficult for corporate 
managers and boards of directors. In fact, the better view is that 
such statutes make life easier rather than harder for incumbent 
management of the large, public corporation. After all, these 
statutes enable management to justify virtually any decision on 
the grounds that it benefits some constituency of the corporation 
or other. 
                                                          
 17 Comm. on Corporate Laws, supra note 2, at 2269. 
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To illustrate the point that other constituency statutes 
increase rather than decrease the degree of freedom enjoyed by 
incumbent managers, one has only to imagine virtually any 
decision or transaction contemplated by a corporation. Take, for 
example, the issue of whether a firm should relocate its 
headquarters from the large metropolis that has served as its 
base for several years to a small town with better schools, lower 
labor costs, and lower taxes. While shareholders might benefit by 
this move, the community in which the firm is currently located 
clearly would suffer. Some employees might benefit by the move, 
while others might suffer. The firm could justify virtually any 
decision as serving the interests of one or more of the firm‘s 
constituencies. Imagine now that the proposal to relocate the 
company comes not from incumbent management, but from an 
outside bidder who is launching a hostile tender offer for the 
company at a substantial premium over the current market price 
of the firm‘s shares. Now the other constituency statute can be 
used to justify resisting an outside offer that may be in the best 
interests of the firm‘s shareholders. This is an additional reason 
why other constituency statutes diminish in value when they are 
shared by more than one group of stakeholders. 
Thus, the primary beneficiaries of other constituency 
statutes are incumbent managers who can justify virtually any 
decision they make on the grounds that it benefits some 
constituency of the firm. Strong support for this assertion lies in 
the fact that not only are these statutes (with a single exception) 
permissive, they do not afford standing to sue to any of the other 
constituencies that they purportedly are designed to benefit.18 A 
similar sentiment was expressed by Dean Robert Clark, who has 
observed that it is socially optimal for corporate law to promote 
the interests of shareholders in profit maximization in a rather 
single-minded fashion: 
A single objective goal like profit maximization is more easily 
monitored than a multiple, vaguely defined goal like the fair and 
reasonable accommodation of all . . . interests. Assuming shareholders 
have some control mechanisms, better monitoring means that 
corporate managers will be kept more accountable. They are more 
likely to do what they are supposed to do and do it efficiently.19 
Like the argument that other constituency statutes are 
ill-advised because they ignore the special status of shareholders 
as residual claimants, the ―too many masters‖ argument is not 
without merit. Indeed, this argument provides what is a logical 
                                                          
 18 Steven M.H. Wallman, The Proper Interpretation of Corporate Constituency 
Statutes and Formulation of Director Duties, 21 STETSON L. REV. 163, 165 (1991). 
 19 ROBERT C. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 20 (1986).  
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explanation of state legislatures‘ eagerness to enact these 
statutes. As has been pointed out, ―Nonshareholder constituency 
statutes . . . are intended to permit consideration of stakeholder 
interests, and, at the same time make hostile takeovers more 
difficult . . . . [I]t is clear that the corporate managers who 
supported these statutes expected them to help protect 
incumbent target management.‖20 Of course the winners of the 
takeover battles of the 1980s were corporate shareholders, while 
the losers were incumbent managers. Other constituency 
statutes give such managers the ability to obtain politically what 
they were unable to obtain in the marketplace—meaningful job 
security regardless of the quality of their performance.  
The problem with the ―too many masters‖ argument is that it 
is overstated. Corporations traditionally have been able to issue 
multiple classes of common and preferred stock, and corporate 
managers and directors have owed fiduciary duties to all of these 
various classes of claimants simultaneously. Moreover, just as 
the interests of common shareholders can conflict with the 
interests of non-shareholder constituencies, so too can the 
interests of one class of equity claimant conflict with the 
interests of another class of equity claimant. In particular, 
certain preferred shareholders may have interests that more 
closely resemble the interests of fixed claimants than the 
interests of common shareholders. Such preferred shareholders 
may seek to discourage the firm from engaging in certain risky 
projects while the shareholders would support the firm‘s decision 
to undertake such projects. 
With respect to corporate law jurisprudence, as the 
Committee on Corporate Law has observed, in no case has the 
all-important Delaware Supreme Court held that directors will 
be permitted to prefer the interests of other constituencies over 
shareholders or that they ought, as a normative matter, to take 
such interests into account.21 The Committee has reformulated 
the position of the Delaware Supreme Court to be that 
directors have fiduciary responsibilities to shareholders which, while 
allowing directors to give consideration to the interests of others, 
compel them to find some reasonable relationship to the long-term 
interests of shareholders when so doing. In Delaware, this principle is 
modified when the decision is made to sell the company, at which time 
the directors may consider only the interests of shareholders.22 
                                                          
 20 Stephen M. Bainbridge, Interpreting Nonshareholder Constituency Statutes, 19 
PEPP. L. REV. 971, 996 (1992). 
 21 See Comm. on Corporate Laws, supra note 2, at 2260.  
 22 Id. at 2261.  
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Another noteworthy facet of the Delaware approach is its 
recognition of the important point that over a wide range of 
issues, no conflict exists between the interests of other 
constituencies and those of shareholders. Acting to improve 
worker morale is good for workers and good for shareholders. 
Taking steps to improve relations with the local community has 
the same effect. Similarly, drafting strong bond covenants or 
developing a reputation for dealing fairly with bondholders or 
other constituencies benefits the shareholders in the form of 
lower interest costs for debt and a lower cost of doing business 
generally. However, as a corporation approaches insolvency, the 
shareholders‘ interests become less relevant, and 
non-shareholder constituencies take on all of the characteristics 
of residual claimants. 
Delaware‘s approach recognizes the Hayekian argument that 
it generally is not possible to identify precisely which actions are 
in shareholders‘ interests and which are not.23 Experimentation 
and after-the-fact observation is required. As such, managers 
require plenty of latitude for experimentation. In addition, many 
technological or managerial improvements to a firm‘s operations 
may well result from pure happenstance and fortuity, rather 
than careful strategic planning. Consequently, judicial efforts to 
hold managers to a strict profit-maximization standard through 
the palliative of ex post judicial review of corporate decisions and 
operations is not likely to benefit anyone other than the legal 
community. The obvious exception to this general rule occurs in 
the case where there is a palpable conflict of interest between the 
actions of managers and the interests of shareholders. Where 
this is the case, there is, of course, an important role played by 
judicial enforcement of corporate law norms. 
In competitive markets, if managers act in ways that are 
sub-optimal from the shareholders‘ perspective, they will be 
disciplined, if at all, by the various markets in which such 
managers must operate.24 Because of the problems of ignorance 
and uncertainty in the world of business, managers often base 
their actions on custom, tradition, force of habit, imitating the 
actions of more successful competitors, or a complex set of 
conflicting motivations. Courts are likely to be even more inept 
                                                          
 23 A basic tenet of Austrian economic thought, as exemplified by the work of 
Friedrich A. Hayek, is that ―there is an unpredictability and indeterminacy with regard to 
human preferences, expectations and knowledge.‖ Israel M. Kirzner, On the Method of 
Austrian Economics, in THE FOUNDATIONS OF MODERN AUSTRIAN ECONOMICS, 48 (Edwin 
G. Dolan ed., Sheed & Ward, Inc. 1976); see also FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, INDIVIDUALISM AND 
ECONOMIC ORDER 46 (1948). 
 24 These markets include the market for corporate control, the internal and external 
managerial labor markets, and the markets for the products offered by the firm. 
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than managers and directors in determining with any certainty 
which actions are in the best interests of shareholders and which 
actions are not. As noted above, over a wide range of issues, 
allowing managers to take the interests of a variety of 
constituencies into account simply recognizes the fact that ex 
post second-guessing of managerial decisions probably does more 
harm than good. Generally, it is best for all parties concerned if 
courts decline to second­guess managers‘ decisions. Only when 
such decisions are clearly being made self-interestedly should 
courts intrude on the internal process of corporate governance. 
To the extent that other constituency statutes are 
interpreted in ways that are consistent with this general norm in 
corporate law, they will be efficient and will benefit societal 
interests, not harm them. Consistent with the approach taken by 
the Delaware Supreme Court, the fact that such statutes give 
incumbent managers more freedom is worrisome only if 
managers can use that freedom in ways that are inconsistent 
with shareholder welfare. 
Thus, the problem with other constituency statutes is not 
that they require managers and directors to serve too many 
masters. Under current law, corporate officials must serve a 
shifting and highly variegated set of masters. Rather, the 
problem is that these statutes potentially permit such managers 
and directors to serve no one but themselves. 
III. SHAREHOLDERS AS THE GROUP WITH THE MOST ACUTE NEED 
FOR FIDUCIARY DUTIES 
The real reason why shareholders value fiduciary duties 
more than other groups, and why non-shareholder constituency 
statutes are unproductive, is that such statutes ignore the severe 
contracting problems faced by residual claimants. These acute 
contracting problems, coupled with the fact that the value of 
being made the beneficiary of corporate fiduciary duties is not in 
the nature of a public good, provide the basic justification for the 
traditional common law rule that managers and directors owe 
their primary fiduciary responsibilities to shareholders. 
Outside of insolvency, non-shareholder constituencies can 
protect themselves against virtually any kind of managerial 
opportunism by retaining negative control over the firm‘s 
operations. Workers, bondholders, even local communities, can 
protect their interests by contracting for the right to veto future 
proposed actions by management. By contrast, the shareholders 
must retain positive control over the actions of the firm in order 
to realize the full potential value of their shares. 
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Merely because non-shareholder constituencies decline to 
contract for the right to veto certain corporate transactions does 
not mean that they were unable to do so. Rather, the absence of 
contractual protection for other constituencies may simply reflect 
the fact that such other constituencies were unwilling to pay for 
such protection in the form of lower wages or lower interest rates 
on debt. 
Workers are perhaps the group with which one sympathizes 
most when thinking about the possible benefits associated with 
other constituency statutes. Unlike shareholders, who are 
concerned with the overall profitability of the firm in which they 
have invested, workers are concerned with wages, hours, and 
working conditions. From a contracting perspective, wages and 
hours present few, if any, problems. Workers potentially could 
protect their expectations concerning wages with pension 
guarantees, severance agreement (golden parachute) contracts, 
stipulated cost-of-living adjustments, and other straightforward 
provisions. Similarly, workers can obtain credible assurances 
against being forced to work undesirable hours simply by 
stipulating the precise length of the workday. Employees can 
achieve guaranteed working conditions by making reference to a 
well-known status quo, and requiring the employer to maintain 
working conditions at that level or above. 
The point here is not to suggest that workers have the 
contracting power to protect their wages, hours, and working 
conditions. Rather, the point is simply that, unlike the situation 
that pertains to the shareholders, it is at least technologically 
possible for workers to protect themselves contractually by 
drafting strong contractual provisions in their favor. Moreover, to 
the extent that future, unforeseen contingencies arise that cast 
doubt on the efficacy of contractual protection, courts can protect 
workers by construing their employment contracts in the light of 
the original purposes behind the agreement. Thus, the gap-filling 
functions provided by modern judges in interpreting contracts 
provides workers with the same sorts of protection that fiduciary 
duties provide for shareholders. 
The above arguments apply with even more force to 
bondholders. First, bondholders can and do draft elaborately 
detailed contracts to protect themselves from transactions that 
upset the original understanding between bondholders and the 
firm regarding the sorts of transactions that are appropriate for 
the firm.25 For example, bond indentures often contain provisions 
                                                          
 25 Clifford W. Smith Jr. & Jerold B. Warner, On Financial Contracting: An Analysis 
of Bond Covenants, 7 J. FIN. ECON. 117, 118–19 (1979). 
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that impose limitations on an issuer‘s ability to pay dividends, 
acquire stock, acquire debt or issue preferred stock, either 
directly or through a subsidiary, to sell assets, or to engage in 
transactions with affiliate companies. While these provisions 
would not provide much protection to shareholders (and indeed 
might be harmful to their interests), they do much to protect 
bondholders and other fixed claimants against wealth transfers 
by other corporate interests. 
Again, it is worth emphasizing that, for the purposes of the 
arguments presented in this paper, the issue is not whether 
bondholders have the bargaining power to obtain every 
contractual protection they desire when covenants and 
indentures are drafted. After all, bondholders, like other 
constituencies, are free to decline to invest in the firm if they are 
not satisfied with the risk-return trade-off being offered. Instead, 
the relevant issue is whether it is technologically possible for the 
bondholders to protect themselves via contract. 
As such, the only reason we do not observe the use of such 
contractual provisions in the real world is that they are 
prohibitively expensive. Unlike shareholders who, absent the 
gap-filling protection afforded by fiduciary duties, cannot obtain 
contractual assurances that a firm will maximize profits, 
bondholders can protect the present value of their fixed claims by 
drafting ―put‖ provisions that give them the legal right to force 
the firm to repurchase the bonds at a pre-determined price upon 
the occurrence of certain contingencies. Put provisions may also 
require the firm to adjust the payments to fixed claimants to 
compensate them for the increased risks associated with certain 
transactions or with downgrades in the firm‘s credit rating. 
The put provisions accompanying bond sales generally are 
triggered by a merger or transfer of a substantial number of 
assets to another firm, a change in the ownership of the firm, a 
significant share repurchase by the firm, or similar transaction.26 
Of course it would be possible to draft even more comprehensive 
protection for bondholders. The right to put the bonds back to the 
firm might be triggered any time the market price of the bonds 
reached a certain level in the open market. Such a broad 
provision would be easy to monitor and enforce, and would 
provide virtually complete protection for bondholders against 
unforeseen contingencies. Thus, to repeat, the issue is not 
whether other constituencies can protect themselves via contract, 
but whether they are willing to pay for such protection. 
                                                          
 26 See Matthew Winkler, Harris, Williams Cos. Unit Are First to Offer Super ‘Poison 
Puts,’ WALL ST. J., Nov. 16, 1988 at C1, C23. 
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IV. GAP-FILLING FOR NON-SHAREHOLDER CONSTITUENCIES 
The familiar retort to the argument made in the preceding 
section is that shareholders and the corporate managers who 
serve them are endlessly creative. As such, no matter how 
elaborate the guarantees, non-shareholder constituencies will be 
unable to protect themselves without the broad-based gap-filling 
provided by fiduciary duties because new strategies will be 
devised to undermine whatever contractual protection other 
constituencies can devise. 
An interesting variant on this argument has been made in 
an important article by Columbia‘s Professor John Coffee. He 
argues that the hostile takeover itself is best viewed as a 
shareholder strategy for reneging on the original bargain 
between non-shareholder constituencies (particularly managers) 
and the firm: 
[T]he hostile takeover can be seen not simply as a mechanism that 
compels a management to accept that level of business risk that 
shareholders deem appropriate, but as a means by which shareholders 
outflank the safeguards managers obtained to protect the promises of 
deferred compensation and job security [that shareholders have given 
to managers]. Thus, what appears from the bidder‘s perspective to be 
a process of purging organizational slack looks from the manager‘s 
viewpoint more like deceptive reneging on the original 
understanding.27 
The ex post reneging argument seems flawed for two 
reasons. First, as noted above, non-shareholder constituencies 
can draft contracts that protect them against the consequences of 
future, unforeseen contingencies. Foreseeable contingencies, such 
as hostile takeovers and corporate restructuring are even easier 
for non-shareholder constituencies to deal with contractually.  As 
discussed in the preceding section, poison puts for bondholders 
and golden parachutes for workers potentially provide virtually 
complete protection for non-shareholder constituencies. 
Second, it is inaccurate to suggest that absent other 
constituency statutes, only shareholders enjoy the protection 
afforded by judicial gap-filling. An impressive literature on 
relational contracts indicates that modern judges should and do 
go a long way towards filling in unstated terms and conditions in 
long-term relational contracts such as those forged between 
non-shareholder constituencies and public corporations.28 
                                                          
 27 John C. Coffee, Jr., Shareholders Versus Managers: The Strain in the Corporate 
Web, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1, 24 (1986). 
 28 See generally Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, The Limits of Expanded Choice: 
An Analysis of the Interactions Between Express and Implied Contract Terms, 73 CALIF. L. 
REV. 261 (1985).  
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Modern courts will examine the nature of the understanding 
between two contracting parties and interpret legal disputes 
between them in the light of this understanding. Thus, 
non-shareholder constituencies (with the exception of local 
communities) already enjoy a substantial degree of protection of 
the gap-filling sort. 
For non-shareholder constituencies, the starting point for 
this judicial gap-filling process must be the contract itself. The 
contract that constitutes the starting point can take a variety of 
forms. It may be an employment agreement, a collective 
bargaining agreement, a bond indenture, or a standard form 
contract between a firm and its suppliers or customers. For 
shareholders, it is widely recognized that the contract between 
managers and shareholders establishes that managers have a 
duty ―to make corporate decisions so as to maximize the value of 
[their] shares.‖29 
Fiduciary duties are a corporate governance device uniquely 
crafted to fill in the massive gap in this open-ended bargain 
between shareholders and corporate officers and directors. On 
the basis of the preceding analysis, it should be clear that recent 
attempts to expand the scope of managements‘ fiduciary duties to 
non-shareholder constituencies are misguided for two reasons 
that previously have gone unrecognized. First, to the extent that 
such duties are legally enforceable, they shift the focal point of 
the legal analysis of the relationship between the 
non-shareholder constituency and the firm away from the actual 
contract between the parties. In other words, allocating fiduciary 
obligations to non-shareholder constituencies takes the judicial 
gap-filling process out of its proper framework, which lies in the 
actual contract that exists between the constituency and the 
firm, and puts it on some other dimension. Removing this 
gap-filling from its proper framework deprives judges of any 
coherent basis for allocating rights and responsibilities within 
the firm. 
Inevitably, removing the gap-filling done by judges for 
non-shareholder constituencies from a contractual framework to 
a fiduciary duty framework creates potential conflicts between 
the express and implied terms of the actual bargains and the new 
―rights‖ being created by corporate constituency statutes. To the 
extent that these new rights are allowed to trump the terms 
contained in a contract between a non-shareholder constituency 
and the firm, such statutes simply transfer wealth from 
                                                          
 29 CLARK, supra note 19, at 17–18; Jonathan R. Macey, Externalities, Firm-Specific 
Capital Investments, and the Legal Treatment of Fundamental Corporate Changes, 1989 
DUKE L.J. 173, 186 (1989). 
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shareholders to these other constituencies. The specter of such 
wealth transfers deprives investors of incentives to invest in 
public corporations and reduces societal wealth generally. Thus, 
to the extent that other constituency statutes create rights for 
non-shareholder groups that are not expressly or impliedly 
contained in the actual agreements between these groups and the 
firm, they will impede the process of capital formation and 
wealth creation in the economy. 
V. THE LOCAL COMMUNITY 
Local communities constitute a possible exception  
to the analysis presented above. Unlike other non-shareholder 
constituencies, local communities may have no pre-existing 
contractual relationship with the firm on which to base a 
reconstruction of the original understanding between the parties 
in the event of future conflict. Of course, it often will be the case 
that a local community will in fact enter into express 
negotiations with a particular firm and agree to provide certain 
services and infrastructure support in exchange for a decision by 
the firm to locate in that community. In such cases, for the 
reasons presented above, layering on a set of fiduciary duties to 
the local community in addition to express contracts between the 
firm and the community will only hinder the ultimate resolution 
of future disputes. 
But often there will be no express or implied understanding 
between a firm and its community.30 Where there is no 
agreement, it seems clear, at least to me, that creating an 
amorphous, open-ended fiduciary duty running from the firm to 
the ―local community‖ in which the firm operates is a singularly 
bad idea. Creating such a duty transforms the role of top 
managers of public companies from that of private businessmen 
into that of unelected and unaccountable public servants. A 
decision to elevate the interests of a local community above the 
interests of a firm‘s shareholders is nothing less than a decision 
about how to allocate wealth within society. There seems to be a 
broad consensus that ―the reallocation of wealth is a function for 
which directors are not especially suited and one beyond the 
general pale of their perceived mandate from society.‖31 
                                                          
 30 See John William Singer, The Reliance Interest in Property, 40 STAN. L. REV. 611, 
618 (1988) (describing the disruptions caused to the community of Youngstown, Ohio, 
when the United States Steel Company closed two plants there). 
 31  Comm. on Corporate Laws, supra note 2, at 2270; see also Christopher J. Smart, 
Takeover Dangers and Non-Shareholders: Who Should Be My Brothers’ Keeper?, 1988 
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 301, 326–39 (1988).   
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As with other non-shareholder constituencies, expanding the 
scope of a firm‘s fiduciary duties to include local communities is 
simply unnecessary. This is because local communities have 
unique access to the political process. To the extent that the 
actions of a firm are genuinely harmful to a local community, the 
members of that community can appeal to their elected 
representatives in state and local government for redress. 
Regardless of whether one has a pluralism or a republican 
perspective on the governmental process,32 local communities 
should be able to mobilize into an effective political coalition to 
press for protection from actions by corporations that are truly 
harmful to such communities. Indeed, upon reflection, the better 
argument seems to be that corporations need protection from 
local communities‘ abuse of the political process at least as much 
as local communities need protection from opportunistic behavior 
by corporations. The political capital being made by local 
politicians over the strike at the New York Daily News illustrates 
this point nicely. There, politicians have been falling all over 
themselves to demonstrate solidarity with the striking Daily 
News employees with little or no regard for the substantive 
merits of the dispute. 
The Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act33 
illustrates the point that local communities are able to protect 
themselves in the political process and hardly need any 
additional protection that might be afforded by a plant closing 
law. The statute requires that, under virtually all conditions, 
firms with 100 or more workers give workers and communities 
sixty days notice prior to closing a plant. The bill requires that 
workers be paid for every day that they are deprived of notice.34 
CONCLUSION 
The argument that the fiduciary duties of officers and 
directors in public corporations should run exclusively to 
shareholders and not to other constituencies is an uneasy one. As 
shown above, the shareholders‘ unique status as residual 
claimants provides a persuasive rationale for allocating fiduciary 
duties to shareholders in some but by no means all situations. In 
simple terms, in those situations in which other constituencies 
have no meaningful stake in a particular decision, they have no 
                                                          
 32 For a republican perspective on government, see Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the 
Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539 (1988). For a pluralism critique, see Jonathan R. 
Macey, The Missing Element in the Republican Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1673 (1988). 
 33 29 U.S.C. § 2102 (2012).  
 34 The statute provides exceptions for businesses struck by unforeseen circumstances 
and businesses in dire financial straits. See Elizabeth Wehr, Reagan Bows to Politics on 
Plant Closing Bill, CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP., AUG. 6, 1988, at 2216. 
Do Not Delete 2/25/2014 8:36 PM 
2014] Corporate Social Responsibility 353 
constructive role to play in the decision-making process. 
Including them in such decisions would lead to opportunism and 
to a diminution in societal wealth. On the other hand, 
non-shareholder constituencies plainly have a significant interest 
in a wide range of decisions that a firm may be called upon to 
make. Thus the special role of shareholders as residual claimants 
does not provide a complete explanation for why shareholders 
should be the exclusive beneficiaries of corporate fiduciary 
duties. 
It is desirable to maintain a system of corporate governance 
in which fiduciary duties are owed exclusively to shareholders 
because no suitable alternative means of protecting shareholders‘ 
claims exist other than by way of a judicially enforced regime of 
fiduciary duties. By contrast, the obligations owed to other 
claimants can be enforced by contract because they are more 
precisely defined than the obligations to shareholders. 
Moreover, in this article I have stressed that the fiduciary 
duties owed to shareholders are a device that serves to fill in the 
implied terms of the contract that exists between shareholders 
and the firm. This contract requires officers and directors of 
corporations to maximize overall firm value for shareholders. The 
fiduciary duties owed to shareholders are the only gap-filling 
device available to protect shareholders‘ investments, whereas 
other claimants enjoy the gap-filling that courts routinely supply 
when interpreting the terms of their contracts with the firm. 
Allocating fiduciary duties to shareholders does not really give 
shareholders a level of protection not enjoyed by non-shareholder 
constituencies. Instead, the fiduciary duties owed to shareholders 
simply provide the residual claimants with a level of judicial 
protection commensurate with the nature of the firm‘s 
contractual obligations to them. Ironically, the ostensible reason 
for passage of non-shareholder constituency statutes is to provide 
such non-shareholder constituents with the enhanced legal 
protections that shareholders enjoy. In fact, in the light of the 
pervasive conflicts of interest that exist between shareholders 
and managers, it seems clear that if any group within the firm is 
in need of additional legal protection it is the shareholders. 
Instead, the recent wave of non-shareholder constituency 
statutes has enhanced the ability of incumbent management to 
justify corporate strategies that reduce the overall value of the 
firm on the grounds that such strategies benefit some 
non-shareholder constituency or other. 
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